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Abstract: 
In his recent article Söderlund (2003) tests structural factors that influence the order 
in which the Russian regions gained a bi-lateral agreement with the federal centre 
emphasizing the importance of ethnicity, religion and economy. We replicate his 
results, and provide an extension where we argue instead that the only significant 
determinants of the bi-lateral process have been economic issues. Our results are 
substantiated by an improved methodology that addresses several debatable choices 
made by the author in the original article. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements: 
We would like to thank Peter J. Söderlund for kindly sharing the data used in his 
article.  
                                                
1 David Dusseault (contact email dusseaud@tcd.ie) and Slava Mikhailov are with the Department of Political Science, Trinity 
College Dublin.  
Martin Ejnar Hansen is with the Department of Political Science, University of Southern Denmark 
1. Introduction 
 
From 1994 to 1998 47 out of Russia’s 89 regions signed bi-lateral treaties with the 
federal centre. Söderlund’s article attempted to fill a gap in the political science 
literature identifying the factors that influenced the success of bi-lateral negotiations. 
The author claims that the order in which the regions received their bi-lateral treaties 
has been determined by three factors: the share of titular nationality in a region; 
whether the titular nationality is Muslim; and relative dependence on federal 
subsidies. Söderlund supports his elaborations empirically.  
 
However, following Filipov and Shvetsova (1999), we argue that the bi-lateral treaty 
process, which has characterized the re-creation of the Russian Federation, was 
predominantly driven by competition for control over economic resources by both 
regional and federal political elites, with religion and ethnicity playing the role of 
bargaining tools in this competition. Methodological problems with the original 
model, identified and addressed in this work, preclude correct identification of the 
factors influential in determining the nature of the power-relations between the federal 
centre and the regions in the Russian Federation. Our empirical results support the 
notion that ethnicity and religion played only secondary role to economy in the bi-
lateral process.  
 
2. Economy versus Ethnicity 
 
Söderlund in his 2003 article argues that ethnicity and religion played an equally 
important role in the bi-lateral treaty negotiation process. Conversely, our view is that 
it has been an elite centered process in which regional and federal political and 
economic elites were attempting to forge a new federal system out of the remnants of 
the Soviet state. Those economic and political residuals blessed and cursed regional 
and federal leaders with different abilities and resources with which they could 
establish a new status within the newly bourgeoning Russian state. 
 
The bargaining process that took place between regional and federal elites operated 
under conditions of great political, economic and social fluidity. Regional leadership 
was left to defend their interests vis-à-vis the federal centre through the bi-lateral 
negotiating process, using their territorial resources as bargaining chips in the 
negotiation game. In order to shed some light on the inner workings of this process, 
we would like to focus our attention on three pertinent questions: 
 
 What interests motivated elites at the federal and regional level during the 
bi-lateral treaty process? 
 
 What mechanisms were at their disposal to forward their interests? 
 
 What independent variable has the most explanatory power explaining 
failure or success in the bi-lateral treaty process? 
 
 
3. What motivates elites? 
 
Gerald Alexander (2002) attempted to explain post World War II democratic 
consolidation in Europe through the use of a soft rational choice approach in which 
democratic consolidation / non-consolidation depended upon the conservative right 
elites’ perception of their opponents’ on the left of the political spectrum behavior and 
whether or not the right’s core values would be protected in the long term by 
consolidating a democratic regime with their leftist rivals.  
 
Alexander’s democratic consolidation paradigm is embedded in a more general 
construct in which two groups of elites located along a left / right preference 
distribution axis are competing for their political interests. These interests are not 
egotistically based; therefore the approach assumes a soft rational choice tack. Each 
group seeks to maximize its position in relation to its particular induced regime 
interests, which are determined by their core values.  
 
An explicit power balance will be consolidated between the elites if and when a 
particular Nash equilibrium is attained and both elite groups are satisfied with the 
achieved arrangement: interests are maximized and core values are ensured in the 
long term.  
 
We believe that this elite value centered model possesses great value in explaining the 
phenomena of the bi-lateral negotiating process that took place in Russia. Like their 
counterparts in Post-World War II Western Europe, Russian regional and federal 
elites were motivated primarily by a core value, that of preservation of their economic 
and political power. This core value was forwarded by mechanisms, some economic 
in nature, some political, some ethnically based. We are convinced that there exists a 
hierarchy of explanatory variables, which are in play with regards to the federal 
bargaining process.  
 
We believe, contrary to Söderlund, that economic variables are the key in the bi-
lateral process, while ethnicity and religiosity are only means to achieving economic 
end and therefore have weaker significance in our analysis. 
  
4. Yeltsin’s Federal Reformation 
 
In response to the collapse of the Soviet System and the rejection of the Communist 
'nomenklatura' elite that upheld the system, Yeltsin and his entourage set on a path 
they term as “Market Bolshevism” in an attempt to destroy the vestiges of the old 
regime and create a new power base in Russia upon which they could legitimize their 
political rule. According to Reddaway & Glinski (2001:35) Yeltsin followed in the 
footsteps of former Russian leaders as Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great and Joseph 
Stalin by trying to create a new class of committed supporters of the regime by 
redistributing national resources. 
 
With the creation of new elite for the Russian Federation under way, the main task 
facing the Yeltsin regime was the preservation of Russia’s political, economic and 
territorial integrity. Bi-lateral agreements were signed between Moscow and the 
regional units, with some contravening the new federal Constitution and mostly 
giving measurable amounts of political and economic autonomy thus creating the 
foundations for centers of political and economic power that rivaled Moscow.  
 
Out of the chaos of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the re-forging of the Russian 
Federation emerged a visibly pronounced elite grouping: those in Moscow and those 
in the regions. The new elites possess a set of core values that inspire their regime 
preference: 
 
“After Putin’s election, the mood of Russia’s political and economic elite 
comprised two main emotions. They were almightily relieved that they and 
their wealth and power had survived through the chaotic last years of the ailing 
Yeltsin’s erratic, roller coaster rule. But they were also desperately anxious 
that this wealth and power be secured and guaranteed, that the state and the 
elite be consolidated and strengthened after all the confrontations and 
dislocations of the Yeltsin years. They wanted all-round consolidation, but not 
at the price of any major new conflict.” (Reddaway and Ortung 2003:12-13) 
 
The new elites in both the federal centre in Moscow and the regions are concerned 
with the preservation of their wealth and political power. According to Alexander 
(2002), the variation in their preferred regime type develops out of the desire to 
maximize the benefits and minimize the costs in defense of these core values. 
 
5. The Mechanisms 
 
How did elites then contest their preferences and protect their economic and political 
power? Robert Ortung has published two influential articles both in the EWI Russian 
Regional Report identifying the mechanisms at work during the process of federal 
creation in Russia. 
 
In the first article, Ortung (2000a) identified ten tools with which the Kremlin was 
able to counteract or influence control over the regional governors. The mechanisms 
outlined are as follows: 
 
• Federal budgetary largess: under Yeltsin buying-off opponents, under Putin 
rewarding allies; 
• Regional differentiation: cleavages and disproportionality of the regions in 
many factors such as economic production, proximity to Moscow all add up to 
a divide and rule political weapon for Moscow; 
• Kremlin support for regional gubernatorial campaigns:  ability to support 
or undercut a specific candidate’s political aspirations; 
• Distribution of federal funds: the granting of export-import privileges along 
with tax loop-holes to aid business development in certain regions; 
• Natural state owned monopolies: possess the ability to control access to and 
levy tariffs on resources such as transport of goods and electricity; 
• Presidential representative in federal districts: active representatives to the 
President of the Federation that acts as the eyes and ears of his administration 
in the regions; 
• Bi-lateral agreements: signed with 46 regions, included political and 
economic “strong incentives” to stay within the federal structure; 
• Federal removal of regional executives: the removal of any regional 
executive found to be in violation of Russian Criminal and Constitutional 
Law; and 
• Limits of governors’ terms in office: no more than two 5-year terms in a row 
are to be served by an individual. 
 
In the second part of the article (Ortung 2000b), Ortung illustrates just what 
mechanisms the governors have at their disposal to counterbalance the political and 
economic might of the Kremlin. Far from being superficial in nature, due to Soviet 
political legacy, the nature of the bi-lateral agreements, the strongman nature of 
Russian regional politics and the economic sink or swim mentality in the regions after 
the 1998 crash, Ortung reveals five instruments at the governors’ disposal: 
 
• Extensive control over the local economy and resources: many governors 
have very good connections with regional businesses; 
• Control of institutional resources translates into political power: utilizing 
their regional power base, governors have the ability to influence political 
campaigns at all levels of the political hierarchy sometimes ensuring re-
election for themselves and a cadre of representatives at all levels of 
government competing in the region’s interest; 
• Circumvention of federal bureaucracies in the regions: governors may be 
truant in their supply, delivery and cooperation with federal representatives on 
their turf; 
• Use of soft budgetary constraints: barter, loans, creative accounting all can 
be used to disguise how the regional treasury is being utilized or manipulated; 
and 
• Regional filibuster: using political clout to block the passage of federally 
initiated directives or policies.   
 
The majority of these mechanisms are economically based. By utilizing the economic 
means at their disposal, federal and regional elites attempted to hammer out 
agreements that suited their particular preferences. 
 
The preponderance of economic mechanisms in use directly ties in with the work of 
Dowley (1998) in which elites possess certain strategies to secure a favorable federal 
arrangement for their territory. The instrumental perspective allows room for a 
rational economic approach to deciphering the bi-lateral agreement process in place of 
an ethnically based view. Ethnicity can be created to suit the prevailing conditions at 
the time of conflict. Elites manipulate the issue of nationality to satisfy a more central 
goal.  
 
In many republics at the time of the collapse of the USSR and the re-working of the 
Soviet federal system, many issues that were brought up by autonomous republics 
were of an economic nature as embodied in the bi-lateral agreement signed by Sakha. 
As Dowley (1998:363) points out, there seems to be some credibility in the alternative 
that posits purely rent-seeking behavior by the regional elites. Governors of resource 
rich states would be more likely to demand autonomy and potential independence 
from Moscow in the pursuit of capturing greater rent from the regional resources than 
was previously sought. 
 
According to the instrumentalist models then, ethnicity as an essential explanatory 
variable in the bi-lateral treaty process is relegated to a less significant position. This 
judgment is substantiated by the logic that ethnicity is not a value of the elites, but a 
mechanism that will help them achieve their ultimate goal of a regionally specific 
level of economic and political autonomy in relation to the federal centre. 
 
If we assume that elites are rationally driven actors then ethnicity is less than stable 
value to espouse due to the fact that a high level of ethnic nationalism would be very 
expensive and would inevitably draw resources away from political and economic 
power of the region. Also in a system in which ethnicity was engineered and 
manipulated to serve politically expedient needs of the state, we would expect that 
there would be higher and lower levels of ethnicity; the measurement of which would 
be very difficult indeed.  
 
Still, for the sake of argument, in regions where latent levels of radical ethno-
nationalism existed, such as Chechnya, an ethnic republic was not the core value 
espoused by elites, but a high degree of economic and political autonomy from the 
federal centre. Ethnicity was an astute bargaining chip however overplayed by the 
Chechen elite. Authors such as Tishkov (1997) in his analysis of the Chechen conflict 
point to the difficulty of identifying the direct or indirect affect the ethnicity variable 
will have on the bargaining game. Tishkov describes a process in which ethnicity is an 
instrument utilized by elites to achieve their economic and political goals. Ethnicity in 
itself does not exist separate from other variables, but is intertwined with them.  
 
6. Empirical Analysis 
 
The methodology used in the original article raises several questions. First and 
foremost is Söderlund’s choice of ordinary least squares (OLS) for estimation of his 
model. The author admits that his dependent variable is a time-index, yet he fails to 
address any of the problems associated with using ‘time’ as a dependent variable. 
Apart from the obvious problem of right censoring, the author’s approach assumes the 
residuals to be normally distributed as part of the classical linear model assumptions. 
Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez (2004: 2) argue that this assumption represents the 
biggest problem in using the OLS with the time-index dependent variable. In 
particular, there is no reason to suspect that the time elapsed between different 
regional treaties signed is normally distributed. Intuitively it makes more sense for the 
distribution of the timing of bi-lateral treaties signed to be non-symmetric, and even 
bimodal. As Cleves et al (2004: 2) note, results estimated with OLS under these 
conditions will not be robust. This point is also emphasized by Wooldridge (2002: 
524-525) who shows that in these situation OLS estimation of the slope coefficient is 
inconsistent. 
 
Instead, a duration model would be more appropriate. Immediate problem concerns 
the arbitrariness of the starting point of the timing index constructed by Söderlund 
(2002) who chose the date of the first treaty signed as the starting point. As Filipov 
and Shvetsova (1999) indicate, the beginning of the bi-lateral negotiating process was 
premeditated and formalized in 1990, and not 1994, with the federal units receiving 
bi-lateral treaties being the units that were specifically targeted already by the late 
Soviet period political elite for bi-lateral agreements. Hence it is rather difficult to 
estimate a correct starting point for the timing index.  
 
Although Söderlund’s choice of the starting point affects only the value of the 
intercept point in his original OLS estimation, it poses a significant problem for 
parametric duration model estimation. At the same time, semi-parametric models, like 
the Cox proportional hazard model, are determined only by the matching and ordering 
of the time of signing of the bi-lateral agreements. In such models time is used only to 
order the data with no special meaning attached to the starting point. As noted by 
Cleves et al (2004: 22), semi-parametric modeling, and the Cox proportional hazard 
model in particular, amounts to a combination of “individual binary-outcome analyses 
at each of the failure times”, where “failure time” would be the time of treaty signing. 
 
As discussed above, the bi-lateral agreement process started in the later period of 
USSR and long before the first treaty was signed with Tatarstan in 1994. Related to 
this issue is the fact that the constituent units that made up the Soviet Union, such as 
union republics and autonomous units of these republics possessed differing degrees 
of economic and also political resources within the hierarchy of political units. 
Despite being considered units within union republics, autonomous republics were 
equally represented at the higher echelons of power and were de facto if not de jure of 
equal status to the union republics. An example stems from the composition of the 
Central Committee of the Soviet Union in 1986, more than half of its 300 full 
members represented different levels of federation members.  
 This situation was quite unique in the Soviet system and allowed more or less equal 
representation for regional interests in Moscow (Filipov and Shvetsova 1999: ). 
Hence when Russian federal centre officials found themselves at the bi-lateral 
agreements negotiations they faced different types of regions, some of them, 
following the tradition of equal representation at the CPSU Central Committee, 
feeling in no way inferior to the newly created federal centre. Thus we believe that 
autonomous status of a region within the Federation had a major influence in 
determining whether the regions received bi-lateral agreements and when they were 
signed. An autonomous status of a region is measured using a dichotomous variable 
from the original data provided by Söderlund, which divides the sample into 
autonomous republics and other types of regions (e.g. krais, oblasts, etc). For our Cox 
proportional hazard model this implies using a stratified estimation where baseline 
hazard will vary according to the type of autonomy enjoyed by regions.  
 
Some of the variables used in the original analysis were re-coded in the replication 
according to the convention, affecting only the presentation of the results (e.g. 
fractions were used instead of percentages). Moreover, in the replication we used a 
log distance instead of the raw number of kilometers from the region administrative 
capital to Moscow as the former is almost normally distributed while the latter is 
significantly skewed to the left. Also with the proxy variable for economic 
dependence Söderlund (2003: 319-20) follows McAuley (1997). Yet McAuley (1997, 
433-434) used the “share of receipts from federal budget in total budget revenue of 
regions" and not the share of regional budget without federal subsidies. Replication 
follows the original McAuley (1997) approach, as we believe it makes more intuitive 
sense in evaluating the economic dependence of the region on the federal centre. 
 
We also re-evaluate Söderlund’s treatment of ethnicity within federal units. He 
measures ethnicity by the share of titular nationality in the region with values given 
only for 20 out of 80 regions in the dataset. We believe that due to a complex federal 
structure of Russia, the share of titular nationality by itself does not provide adequate 
information on ethnic fractionalization. In the absence of necessary data in the 
original article to compose an ethnic fractionalization index following Alesina, 
Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2002) the share of Russians in a 
region in combination with the share of titular nationality should provide a reasonable 
approximation of the ethnicity measure.  
 
The aim of this paper, as well as Söderlund’s (2002) original research, is to identify 
the variables that influenced the timing of the bi-lateral agreements. The robustness of 
the results can be evaluated through an alternative specification, by asking what 
influenced whether a region was successful or not in securing a bi-lateral treaty. This 
alternative specification is estimated using a logit regression. The influence of the 
status of autonomy is estimated in this model using a dummy variable provided by 
Söderlund (2002). 
 
Our analysis shows that dependence or independence of federal subsidies is the only 
significant determinant in bi-lateral process in all specifications. Ethnicity also plays a 
prominent role, although it is not robust to model specification, with logit estimates of 
ethnicity being marginally insignificant at the conventional .05 significance level. 
Moreover, contrary to Söderlund’s results we find that whether a region is 
predominantly Muslim had no effect on the outcome of negotiation process between 
the regions and the centre.  
 
The first column of results in Table 1 presents estimates of Söderlund’s (2003) 
original model. The second column shows results for Cox proportional hazard model 
with ethnicity defined only by the share of titular nationality in the population of the 
region. Next we estimate the same model adding the share of Russian population in 
the region. Followed by a stratified Cox model accounting for different baseline 
hazard according to the type of autonomy enjoyed by the region. Robustness of our 
results is estimated using two specifications of a logit regression, with the second 
accounting for a regional autonomy status through a dummy variable available in 
Söderlund’s original data. 
 
We also present results of a link test for the specification of the dependent variable 
following Tukey (1949) further developed by Pregibon (1980). And a proportionality 
test …. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
This paper attempted to review the structural factors that influenced the timing of the 
bi-lateral treaties in Russia identified in the literature. We also provide empirical 
evidence for the argument that, contrary to the views presented in the mass media and 
supported by Söderlund, ethnicity and religion play at best only secondary role to 
economic issues in the relations between the federal centre and the regions in Russia. 
Further research on the issue utilizing improved data with correctly constructed 
ethnicity and religion variables following Alesina et al (2002) can provide empirical 
evidence on the nature of some conflicts between the centre and the regions in modern 
Russia with Chechnya being the most obvious example. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. 
 
Variables OLS Cox 
Hazard Ratio 
Stratified 
Cox 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Logit Logit with 
regional 
status 
dummy 
Original 
Model 
Modified 
Model 
Share of titular 
nationality2 
1.590 
(.443) 
0.001 
29.758 
(33.986) 
0.003 
.212  
(.490) 
0.502 
.225 
(.571) 
0.556 
-3.54 
(4.472) 
0.428 
-.728 
(5.152) 
0.888 
Muslim dummy 85.639 
(29.548) 
0.006 
1.037  
(.932)  
0.967 
.754  
(.667) 
 0.749 
.915 
(.813) 
0.920 
-1.12 
(1.369) 
0.413 
-1.377 
(1.471) 
0.349 
Budget 
subsidies3 
1.719 
(.631) 
0.010 
.004 
(.006) 
0.000 
.004 
(.007) 
0.000 
.010 
(.014) 
0.001 
-6.527 
(2.169) 
0.003 
-6.953 
(2.277) 
0.002 
Distance from 
Moscow4 
.007 
(.004) 
0.099 
1.366  
(.232) 
0.066 
1.143 
(.227) 
0.499 
1.114 
(.221) 
0.587 
.024 
(.308) 
0.938 
.054 
(.311) 
0.863 
Border/port 31.125 
(15.188) 
0.048 
1.143 
(.387) 
0.694   
.996 
(.339) 
0.990 
1.129 
(.388) 
0.724 
.098 
(.560) 
0.861 
.044 
(.566) 
0.938 
Share of 
Russians 
  .005  
(.011) 
.017 
.009 
(.02) 
0.033 
-7.812 
(4.321) 
0.071 
-8.179 
(4.329) 
0.059 
Regional Status 
dummy 
     -1.413 
(1.343) 
0.293 
Constant -105.609 
(59.566) 
0.085 
   8.996 
(5.486) 
0.101 
9.537 
(5.617) 
0.090 
Link test for 
model 
specification 
P value 
 0.174 
passed 
0.079 
passed 
0.087 
passed 
0.148 
passed 
0.105 
passed 
Test of the 
proportional 
hazard 
assumption 
Chi sq (P value) 
 22.55 
0.0004 
failed 
18.59 
0.0049 
failed 
10.04 
0.1228 
passed 
  
Adj. R2/Pseudo 
R2 
.502    0.1557 0.1664 
Log Likelihood  -152.186 -149.603   -131.056 -44.277 -43.713 
LR  17.20 22.37 17.59 16.33 17.46 
p-value  0.0041 0.0010 0.0074 0.0121 0.0147 
N 42 75 75 75 76 76 
First number in the cells is the coefficient. Second the standard errors. Third the p-
value. 
                                                
2 As discussed above we express the share of titular nationality and the share of Russians as a 
proportion instead of raw percentages used by Söderlund (2003). 
3 Independence of subsidies in original specification, and dependence on subsidies in our replication. 
4 Distance in kilometres in original specification and log distance in replication. 
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